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Abstract
We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which
realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash
implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.
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1 Introduction
A social planner desires to implement some social policy or alternative for society but
does not know the preferences of the agents. Implementation theory focuses on methods
of eliciting these preferences in various contexts. The typical way is to create an incentive
for agents to announce their preferences. This is done is by forcing agents to play a game,
in which by acting in their best interests, they end up implementing the social choice rule.
The main question of the implementation literature is which types of social choice rules
can be so implemented. Our purpose is to discuss a connection between two strands of
the implementation literature.
Repeated implementation focuses on the specific case in which the social alternative is
actually a stream of alternatives—that is, the social alternative may change through time.
Suppose agents possess time-separable preferences, and all agents’ discount factors are
known to the social planner. Kalai and Ledyard [3] introduce this model and establish
important results on implementation in this environment. They establish that for any
given social choice rule, one can construct another social choice rule which coincides with
the original one after some fixed period of time and which is implementable in dominant
strategies. Thus, it is always in all agents best interest to report their true preferences,
irrespective of what other agents do.
Virtual implementation focuses on the special case of risky social alternatives (i.e.
lotteries) and agents who conform to the expected utility axioms. In this one-stage
environment, any social choice rule which, for every possible preference profile, assigns
a positive probability to all social alternatives can be implemented in Nash equilibrium
(i.e. there exists a game form for which agents playing a Nash equilibrium select the
desired social alternative).(see Matsushima [6] and Abreu and Sen [1]).
We exploit the similarity of the linear structure of time separable preferences and
expected utility preferences to establish a result closely related to the virtual implemen-
tation result described above. Working in a continuous time repeated implementation
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framework, we establish that any social choice rule which, for every possible preference
profile, realizes each social alternative for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time,
is Nash implementable. Thus, we may think of our result as a reinterpretation of the
virtual implementation results that might be called “repeated virtual implementation.”
Our main result relies on the critical assumption that the social planner knows each
agents’ discount factor. If this is not the case, almost nothing is implementable in our
environment. This assumption should not be taken lightly. We point out; however,
that the assumption of known discount factors is also present in the work of Kalai and
Ledyard [3], where they play an even more critical role. In our work, any social choice
rule which realizes all alternatives is Nash implementable. In their work, the class of
social choice rules which are implementable (in dominant strategies) is a function of the
discount factors of the agents; when agents are more patient, less social choice rules are
implementable.
The other critical assumption is that preferences are time-separable. Linearity as-
sumptions on preference have been criticized in the literature (see, for example, Jackson
[2]). Linearity is usually assumed to obtain tractability of a model. However; virtual
implementation results are not robust to the specification of linear utility. For example,
in the risk case, an agent who has non-expected utility preferences does not have linear
preferences. In the repeated implementation case, general recursive utility preferences
(as in Koopmans [4]) are non-linear.
Section 2 provides the model. Section 3 presents our main result. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Let N be a set of agents, where |N | ≥ 3. Let X be a finite set of alternatives.
Alternatives are meant to be understood as social alternatives, which may be realized
at a given point in time. The set of alternative streams is the set of functions
x : [0,∞) → X which are Borel measurable; X∗ denotes the set of alternative streams.
Thus, our model is one of continuous time, where time is indexed from 0 to ∞.1 An
alternative stream is interpreted as a social alternative which changes over time. There
are many reasons for allowing a social alternative to change over time; the most obvious
such reason is to achieve fairness (for example, selecting my favorite alternative today
and yours tomorrow).
Agents’ preferences over alternative streams are representable by time-separable util-
ity functions. We assume that the social planner knows each agents’ discount factor.
To this end, for all i ∈ N , let δi ∈ (0, 1) be a discount factor for agent i. For all i, let
Ui be a collection of functions ui : X → R which are nonconstant. The set Ui is inter-
preted as a set of possible utility indices. Agent i’s preference over alternative streams
1All of our results continue to hold if time ends at some T > 0.
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is represented by Ui : X → R, where Ui (x) =
R∞
0
e−δitui (x (t)) dt, for some ui ∈ Ui. The
set of preference relations for agent i is denoted by Ri. Given that each agent’s discount
factor is known, a utility index uniquely identifies a preference over alternative streams.
Say an alternative stream x realizes all alternatives if for all x ∈ X,R∞
0
1{x(t)=x}dt > 0. Thus, an alternative stream realizes all alternatives if every pos-
sible alternative is in place for some positive (perhaps arbitrarily small) amount of time.
The set of alternative streams which realize all alternatives is denoted by Xr.
Define a social choice rule as a nonempty-valued correspondence ψ :
Q
i∈N Ri ⇒
X∗. A social choice rule recommends a collection of alternative streams for every possible
profile of utility indices. Say a social choice rule ψ realizes all alternatives if for all
R ∈
Q
i∈N Ri, ψ (R) ⊂ Xr.
We assume that the social planner does not know the agents’ preferences over alter-
native streams. Thus, he must rely on the agents to announce their preferences. We
study the reliability of such announcements. Hence, define a game form as a tuple
(S, g), where S ≡
Q
i∈N Si, and g : S → X∗. The set S is a set of strategies. Given
a preference profile R = (Ri)i∈N , a game form naturally induces a normal-form game,
where s is preferred to s0 by agent i if g (s)Rig (s0). Let N (S, g,R) be the set of Nash
equilibria of the game induced by (S, g) and R. Say a social choice rule ψ is Nash im-
plementable if there exists a game form (S, g) such that g (N (S, g,R)) = ψ (R). Thus,
a social choice rule is Nash implementable if the social planner can set up a strategic sit-
uation whereby agents, playing the game in their best interests, select the recommended
social alternative.
3 Results
The main result of this note is that any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives
is Nash implementable.
Theorem: If a social choice rule realizes all alternatives, then it is Nash implementable.
The proof strategy is simple and is essentially a reinterpretation of virtual implemen-
tation [1, 6]. Any alternative stream which realizes all alternatives can be thought of as
being in the “interior” of the set of alternative streams. Maskin’s famous theorem [5]
asserts that any social choice rule which is “monotonic” and satisfies “no-veto power” is
Nash implementable (when there are at least three agents). Given the “linear” structure
of time-separable utility functions, the only Maskin monotonic transformations of a time-
separable preference in the “interior” of the set of alternative streams is that preference
itself. Hence, such social choice rules are trivially monotonic. Any two preferences
which coincide on the set of alternative streams which realize all alternatives coincide on
all alternative streams. This fact allows us to construct an induced social choice rule
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defined on the domain of alternative streams which realize all alternatives, and time-
separable preferences restricted to this domain. On such a domain, no agent ever has
a “most-preferred” alternative. Hence, no veto power is vacuously satisfied. Thus, at
least on this domain, any social choice rule is implementable. The proof concludes by
identifying a social choice rule over alternative streams with its induced social choice rule
over alternative streams which realize all alternatives.
The theorem can be interpreted as saying that for any social choice rule, there exists
a Nash implementable social choice rule which is “arbitrarily close” to the original rule.
Agents must only wait through all alternatives at some point—perhaps only for a fleeting
moment. It is not even specified when the agents must wait through these alternatives.
This seems a small price to pay for completely resolving strategic issues.
Jackson [2] points out the possibility of renegotiation in the implementation liter-
ature. Such criticisms clearly apply in repeated implementation. Specifically, in our
environment, suppose that alternative x ∈ X is the least preferred by all agents according
to the utility indices. A social choice rule which realizes all alternatives must feature x
for some positive amount of time. It seems natural for all agents to agree to “contract
out” of this x phase, as x is Pareto dominated.
Kalai and Ledyard’s [3] result focuses on those social choice rules which are almost
dominant strategy implementable. Specifically, they show that for any social choice rule,
there exists an alternative social choice rule which coincides with it after some point in
time, and which is dominant strategy implementable. The major drawback of this work
is that the amount of time that the agents need to wait until the desired rule is realized
may be very large; in fact it is a function of the agents’ discount rates. Agents may also
only announce from a finite set of possible preferences. For all agents, these preferences
must be ordinally distinct, in that utility indices cannot be monotonic transformations
of each other. Our work has neither of these features. However; we restrict to a finite
number of possible alternatives and require that the number of agents is at least three.
The proof is essentially a translation of the virtual implementation arguments into
the repeated implementation framework. For a good intuition behind these types of
proofs, see Jackson [2].
Proof: The proof is completed in a series of steps. Let ψ be a social choice rule which
realizes all alternatives. We show that ψ is Nash implementable. For agent i, say that
a preference relation R0i is a monotonic transformation of Ri at x if for all y in the
domain, xRiy =⇒ xR0iy. Say a rule ψ is Maskin monotonic (see Maskin [5]) if whenever
x ∈ ψ (R), if R0i is a monotonic transformation of Ri at x for all i, then x ∈ ψ (R0). We
will apply Maskin’s famous theorem on suﬃcient conditions for implementation. Thus,
say that a rule ψ satisfies no veto power if there exists i ∈ N such that if there exists
x such that for all j 6= i, for all y, xRjy, then x ∈ ψ (R). Maskin shows that any rule
satisfying Maskin monotonicity and no veto power is Nash implementable when there
are at least three agents.
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Our proof establishes that any rule whose outcomes lie in Xr is vacuously Maskin
monotonic. Moreover, by changing the domain of the rule so that preferences are only
defined over Xr, we can establish that no veto power is also vacuously satisfied. Thus,
any such rule is Nash implementable.
Step 1: A preference relation is completely determined by its restriction
to Xr.
Let i ∈ N and suppose that Ri, R0i ∈ Ri. We establish that Ri|Xr = R0i|Xr if and
only if Ri = R
0
i. There exists ui ∈ Ui such that for all x,y ∈ Xr, xRiy if and only ifR∞
0
e−δitui (x (t)) dt ≥
R∞
0
e−δitui (y (t)) dt.
Order the elements of X = {x1, ..., xm}. For all x ∈ X, define an element x∗ ∈ Xr
so that for all i = 0, ...,m − 1, if t ∈ [i − 1, i), then x∗ (t) = xi, and otherwise, x∗ (t) =
x (t+m). Then it is obvious that for all x,y ∈ X∗.Z ∞
0
e−δitui (x (t)) dt ≥
Z ∞
0
e−δitui (y (t)) dt
if and only if Z ∞
0
e−δitui (x
∗ (t)) dt ≥
Z ∞
0
e−δitui (y
∗ (t)) dt.
This is enough to establish the result.
Step 2: Defining the social choice rule on Xr.
Define ψ∗ : R|Xr ⇒ Xr by ψ∗ (R|Xr) = ψ (R). Step 1 tells us that ψ∗ is well-defined.
As ψ realizes all alternatives, the range of ψ∗ is actually a subset of Xr. As for all i ∈ N
and all Ri|Xr ∈ Ri|Xr , Ri|Xr has no maximal choice (this follows from the fact that for
all Ri ∈ Ri, Ri is nonconstant), the no veto power condition of Maskin [5] is vacuously
satisfied.
Step 3: The new rule is Maskin monotonic.
We show that ψ∗ is Maskin monotonic. This is done by showing that for all i ∈ N and
all Ri|Xr , R0i|Xr ∈ Ri|Xr , if R0i|Xr is a monotonic transformation of Ri|Xr at any x ∈ Xr,
then R0i|Xr = Ri|Xr . This then implies that the hypothesis of Maskin monotonicity is
vacuously satisfied, and ψ∗ is thus Maskin monotonic. By Maskin’s theorem, there exists
a game form (S, g) which implements ψ∗ on this restricted domain.
Thus, let x ∈ Xr. Let Ri|Xr ∈ Ri|Xr . Let ui be a utility index corresponding
to Ri|Xr . The index ui is nonconstant by hypothesis. Next, let R0i|Xr be any other
preference relation, with corresponding utility index u0i. The indices ui and u
0
i are not
cardinally related. If they were, then Ri and R
0
i would be the same preference relation.
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Let Y =
n
z ∈ RX++ :
P
x∈X zx =
1
δi
o
. Any element of Xr can be associated with an
element of Y , and each element of Y can be associated (nonuniquely) with an element
of Xr.
Associate x with z ∈ Y such that for all x ∈ X, zx =
R∞
0
e−δit1{x(t)=x}dt. Then,
Ui (x) = ui · z and U 0i (x) = u0i · z. Clearly, as each of ui and u0i are nonconstant, and
as z is in the interior of the simplex, there exists z0 ∈ Y such that ui · z ≥ ui · z0 and
u0i · z0 > u0i · z. The vector z0 can then be associated with an element of Xr: simply let
x0 ∈ Xr such that
R∞
0
e−δit1{x0(t)=x}dt = z0x. Then, xRi|Xrx0 and x0P 0i |Xrx. Thus, R0i|Xr
is not a monotonic transformation of Ri|Xr .
Thus, ψ∗ trivially satisfies Maskin monotonicity. We conclude that ψ∗ is Nash im-
plementable.
Step 4: The original rule is Nash implementable.
To see that ψ is Nash implementable, let (S, g) be the game form which Nash imple-
ments ψ∗. We claim that it also Nash implements ψ. Let R ∈ R. We claim that the
Nash equilibria for the game induced by (S, g,R|Xr) coincide with the Nash equilibria
for the game induced by (S, g,R). In particular, g (N (S, g,R|Xr)) = ψ∗ (R|Xr). By
definition of ψ∗, ψ∗ (R|Xr) = ψ (R). If s is a Nash equilibrium for (S, g,R|Xr), then it
is also a Nash equilibrium for (S, g,R). To see this, let i ∈ N and let s0i ∈ Si. Then
g (s)Ri|Xrg (s0i, s−i), so that by definition, as g (s) , g (s0i, s−i) ∈ Xr, g (s)Rig (s0i, s−i), and
s is a Nash equilibrium for (S, g,R). Similarly, it can be established that if s is a Nash
equilibrium for (S, g,R), then it is also a Nash equilibrium for (S, g,R|Xr). This estab-
lishes that g (N (S, g,R)) = ψ (R), so that in fact ψ is Nash implementable by the game
form (S, g).
4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on implementation by pointing out a previously
unrecognized connection between virtual and repeated implementation. Our model fo-
cuses on continuous time. Kalai and Ledyard’s seminal work is done in discrete time.
A result analogous to our main theorem in discrete time is therefore desirable.
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